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Abstract: Every day, human beings make decisions with social consequences. These social
consequences matter most when they impact those closest to us. Recent research has
shown that humans exhibit reliable preferences when deciding between conflicting
outcomes involving close others – for example, prioritizing the interests of one’s family
member over one’s friend. However, virtually nothing is known about the mechanisms
that drive these preferences. We conducted a pre-registered study in a large
(maximum N  =375) sample to quantify the computational and motivational
mechanisms of human social decision-making preferences involving close others. By
pairing assessment techniques from behavioral economics and psychological science
with computational modeling and random coefficient regression, we show that value-
based cognitive computations (e.g., risk and loss aversion) drive social decision-
making preferences involving financial outcomes, whereas socioemotional motivations
(e.g., relationship quality) underlie preferences involving social outcomes. These
results imply mechanistic heterogeneity, underscoring a need for greater attention to
contextual specificity in social decision-making.
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We appreciate the thoughtful feedback of the reviewers and the editor, and are thrilled to have 
the opportunity to revise our manuscript. We have made every effort to respond to the comments 
of the editor and all three reviewers. 
We tried to be especially diligent in (i) responding to concerns about sample size, (ii) the 
interpretation of monetary v social outcomes, and (iii) the benefits of computational modeling, 
among the other issues raised by reviewers.  
The following is a quoted list of concerns from the reviewers and our response to each. Though 
we tried to be as responsive as possible, we are happy to make additional changes in the editor 
and reviewers believe it is in the best of interest of producing the strongest possible manuscript.  
Overall, we believe our response to the comments below have greatly strengthened the paper and 
we are confident it is more suitable for publication in the Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology. 
Reviewer 1  
  
1. “The sample sizes for the discounting task and the gambling task separately seem adequate to 
me, but I am concerned about the limited overlap between them. N = 75 would not be ideal for 
assessing even a bivariate association. I fear that it is substantially underpowered for testing 
multiple moderation effects. I think that the authors need to at least acknowledge this as a 
limitation in the discussion, and refrain from strongly interpreting null results in the 
corresponding analyses.” 
We agree with the reviewer that very large samples are critical for performing statistical 
inference in individual differences research. However, we note that our use of multilevel logistic 
regression in modeling decision-level behavior on the discounting tasks affords us more power 
than may be initially apparent. While we only have N = 75 individuals (level-2 observations), we 
also had 98 decisions per run of each task (level-1 observations). This is important to note 
because hypothesis tests regarding individual differences (e.g., the extent to which relationship 
quality or computational parameters moderated choice behavior on the discounting tasks) 
involve cross-level interactions (e.g., Condition (level-1) x Individual Difference (level-2)). That 
we have nearly 100 level 1 observations means our power for cross-level interactions receive 
quite a boost. Simulation studies from quantitative psychology show, generally, 80% power can 
be achieved with at least 70 level-2 units and 75 level-1 units (Astivia, Gadermann, & Guhn, 
2019; Mathieu, Aguinis, Culpepper, & Chen, 2012).  
Response to Reviewers (without Author Details)
However, for good measure and out of caution, we have included the following statement about 
power in the Limitations & Future Directions section of the manuscript.  
Pg. 26-27:  
“Additional follow-up work could also focus on directly replicating our individual differences 
findings with larger sample sizes. While we note that our individual difference analyses were 
well-powered on the strength of having nearly 100 decision-level (level 1) observations (Astivia, 
Gadermann, & Guhn, 2019; Mathieu, Aguinis, Culpepper, & Chen, 2012), future work with 
larger sample sizes would lend increased confidence in the present results by further reducing 
noise in estimates of random slopes and effect sizes and potentially improving power.” 
 
2. “In table 1/figure 2, the reward ratio coefficient is significantly positive in the delay-monetary 
case. Does this mean that in this version of the game, people actually prefer smaller, later 
amounts of money to sooner, larger amounts? If so, what are we to make of this?” 
We thank the reviewer for their careful attention to our output and for spotting this. There was a 
clerical error when entering the relevant value into Table 1. This has since been corrected, 
showing that while positive, the parameter for this effect is not significant. We have verified the 
rest of the table for accuracy. Figure 2 remains accurate.  
 
3. “It is difficult to know how to interpret the monetary vs. social results. The authors - perhaps 
wisely - do not attempt to directly contrast them. However, it is difficult to avoid some 
comparison, if only informal, rather than statistical. Were the social results weaker because 
people really think differently about shared time than money? Or was the magnitude of the 
manipulation stronger in the monetary condition? Although I realize that it is difficult to equate 
these qualitatively, it might be possible to get some traction on this problem by looking at the 
point of subjective equivalence between shared time with friends/family, and those same close 
others receiving money? That is, how much money would you have to give my friend for me to 
feel like that was worth 20 minutes of our time together? I don't suppose that the authors have 
any additional data in which participants asked such a question? I'm not sure it would make 
sense to try to collect new data on this right now (even online) since people' preferences may 
well have shifted due to the results of covid19. However, if some data along these lines does 
already exist, it might be possible to use it get a better sense of how to compare time and 
money.” 
The reviewer is correct in noting that we were hoping to avoid too much comparison between the 
pattern of results with social and nonsocial outcomes for exactly the reasons described. That said, 
we realize that we still have an obligation to make thoughtful and careful remarks about results 
in the social and nonsocial domains and appreciate the reviewer’s thoughts on this matter.  
To address this comment, we first ran additional analyses on the discounting tasks as suggested 
by the reviewer. For a given discounting task (e.g., probabilistic discounting, social outcomes; 
delay discounting, monetary outcomes; etc.), we fit traditional value-based hyperbolic models on 
each condition of the data: trials on which the parent received the discounting outcome/friend 
received the non-discounting outcome, and trials on which the friend received the discounting 
outcome/parent received the non-discounting outcome. This allowed us to compare discounting 
rates between the two conditions.  
Afterwards, we took a difference score [parent discounting rate – friend discounting rate] for 
each discounting task and statistically compared difference scores from social and monetary 
outcomes (e.g., compared discounting rate difference score in delay discounting with monetary 
outcomes to discounting rate difference score in delay discounting with social outcomes). These 
analyses revealed that there were greater differences in delay discounting rates when monetary 
outcomes were at stake, compared to social outcomes. That is, individuals discounted larger 
long-term monetary rewards for friends in favor of smaller short-term monetary rewards for 
parents at a greater rate than the opposite. By contrast, delay discounting rates between the 
conditions were more equivocal when social outcomes were at stake. There were no significant 
differences in probabilistic discounting behavior. The manuscript has been updated to reflect 
these data. The details are presented in the supplement (Follow-Up Analysis: Comparing 
Discounting Decision Preferences with Monetary and Social Outcomes), and the results are 
summarized in the results section (Pg. 21, Post-Hoc Analysis: Directly Comparing Behavior 
when Monetary vs Social Outcomes are at Stake) of the main document.  
To further address this comment, we have added a new paragraph to the discussion where we 
explicitly compare the monetary rewards to the social rewards. The aforementioned results from 
additional analyses are referenced there, in addition to other points made by the reviewer. Pg. 23: 
“A post-hoc and preliminary statistical comparison provides some evidence to suggest that 
observed differences between reward types were not due to chance—that parent-oriented 
preferences with monetary rewards are indeed stronger than parent-oriented preferences with 
social rewards when making delay discounting decisions (but not probabilistic discounting). This 
could be due to a number of reasons, ranging from the salience of the social rewards we offered, 
to task demands related to computing value for money compared to social rewards (it may be 
more difficult to compute value calculations for ‘time spent’ than dollars), and to the ease with 
which individuals implicitly compute probabilities when making discounting decisions 
(potentially explaining the null finding when contrasting decision preferences for monetary and 
social outcomes in probabilistic discounting). Additional manipulations in future studies can help 
unpack these effects, perhaps with the help of cross-model reward decisions (e.g., asking 
individuals to assign a monetary value to social outcomes).” 
Last, we respond to the reviewer’s question about additional data existing to further 
disambiguate our pattern of findings with social vs monetary outcomes by noting that no such 
data exist. We agree with the reviewer that it is inappropriate to collect more data on this matter 
since large-scale changes in social dynamics as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic may play a 
confounding role in swaying social decision preferences.  
 
4. “The IPPA seems like a reasonable measure of relationship quality, but its items do not seem 
to tap into the notion of obligation or family duty. Many people and cultures view parents and 
children as owing each other certain obligations, regardless of their quality of their relationship. 
This is especially true in financial matters, where family are often expected to support one 
another. This sense of duty might account for some of participants' preference for their parents 
in the monetary discounting task, and their desire to avoid occasioning them with financial loss 
gambling task. The authors touch on this on page 22-23. Do any of the other individual 
difference measures that the authors collected have items that could be used to explore this 
possibility?” 
We agree with the reviewer that, in theory, notions of obligation to parents and friends likely 
play a role in shaping social decision preferences. In fact, we have pursued this notion in prior 
studies that also examined social decision-making behavior involving conflicting outcomes for 
parents and friends. Analyses in said prior studies have yielded inconclusive findings regarding 
the role that familial obligation plays in shaping social decision preferences (authors, 2018). In 
our view, the main challenge that lies behind this research endeavor lies in methodology. First, 
we have yet to find a satisfactory measure of obligation to friends (whereas a valid and reliable 
analog readily exists for family/parents), making it very difficult to compare the role that 
relationship obligation plays when making decisions on behalf of multiple close others. Second, 
and perhaps this is the reason behind the first issue, it is difficult to equate obligation to parents 
and friends because of intrinsic differences in how cultures construe relationships with kin and 
friends. One possible albeit indirect way of examining these issues in future work would be to 
systematically examine whether cultural identity moderates decisions regarding parents and 
friends. We have added an additional passage to the discussion to convey these thoughts to 
readers.  
Pg. 23-24: “If these differences are replicated, future work may wish to identify why they exist in 
the first place. We have speculated that obligation to parent and friend relationships most likely 
plays a large role (authors, 2018), but were unable to find compelling evidence (and no study 
measures collected here can speak to this notion). Additional work in this vein will need to 
carefully consider what obligation means in the context of parent and friend relationships, and 
thoughtfully select (or even devise) methods to sensibly equate the two for quantitative analyses. 
This difficulty highlights the possibility that qualitative analysis may be useful in resolving this 
issue while the field attempts to find an appropriate quantitative articulation. Finally, given prior 
work demonstrating the role that culture plays in feelings of familial obligation (Fuligni & 
Pedersen, 2002; Tsai, Telzer, Gonzales, & Fuligni, 2015), future work ought to formally examine 
how cultural differences shape social decision making for parents and friends.” 
 
5. “Although I personally am well-disposed towards taking a more computational approach to 
these questions, I think it might be worth describing their benefits in this context more. That is, 
what were the benefits of using economic games and computational modeling over simply asking 
people whether they would prefer to give money (or time) to their parents or to their friends? (Or 
to gamble with their parents' or friends' money?). A few extra sentences on this point might help 
better justify the methods to more skeptical readers.” 
We agree that this could be useful and have added additional justification for the use of 
computational models to the introduction. Pg. 6: 
“We note that our use of behavioral economics tasks in conjunction with computational 
modeling is a strength of this study for two major reasons. First, models make precise predictions 
about phenomena in ways that are easily verifiable and generative (i.e., probabilistic). Second, 
they can do not require introspection, and thus provide complementary insights to information 
gathered by self-report (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).” 
Reviewer #2:  
 
1. “I think it might be worth including in the discussion some thoughts about how these results 
should be interpreted given the demographics in the study. Specifically, my understanding is that 
there are meaningful gender differences in both value-based decision making and 
socioemotional attachment. Given that this study had less than 20% male participants, is there 
reason to be cautious about assuming these results would generalize to men as well as women?” 
We agree with the reviewer that we should have included a note about generalizability given the 
gender breakdown of the current sample. Despite the fact this study—and others from our 
group—did not find gender differences, it is nevertheless important to make readers aware of 
prior work that has observed gender differences and to raise the possibility that these results may 
not generalize. The following has been added to the discussion section Pg. 26: 
“In further considering generalizability, it is worth noting that our sample demographics (mostly 
white and Asian-American, mostly female, mostly late adolescent/young adult) is certainly not 
representative of all adults in the United States, let alone the world. Future work should strive to 
examine these effects in other populations, and we caution readers to bear these constraints on 
generalizability in mind when evaluating our results. This is particularly important to consider 
given prior work linking gender to differences in value-based decision making (Cardoos et al., 
2017; Fancis, Hasan, Park, & Wu, 2015; Zachry, Johnson, & Calipari, 2019), though we 
observed no such gender differences in the present study.” 
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Every day, human beings make decisions with social consequences. These social consequences 
matter most when they impact those closest to us. Recent research has shown that humans 
exhibit reliable preferences when deciding between conflicting outcomes involving close others 
– for example, prioritizing the interests of one’s family member over one’s friend. However, 
virtually nothing is known about the mechanisms that drive these preferences. We conducted a 
pre-registered study in a large (maximum N=375) sample to quantify the computational and 
motivational mechanisms of human social decision-making preferences involving close others. 
By pairing assessment techniques from behavioral economics and psychological science with 
computational modeling and random coefficient regression, we show that value-based cognitive 
computations (e.g., risk and loss aversion) drive social decision-making preferences involving 
financial outcomes, whereas socioemotional motivations (e.g., relationship quality) underlie 
preferences involving social outcomes. These results imply mechanistic heterogeneity, 
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Computational and Motivational Mechanisms of Human Social Decision Making Involving 
Close Others 
As members of a highly social species, humans frequently make decisions that have 
consequences for other individuals. In real life, our decisions most commonly impact those 
closest to us, including our friends and family (Henrich, 2002; Mathews, 1987). Indeed, 
observational research suggests that close others can strongly influence decisions regarding 
education, employment, health, and finances (Fareri, Smith, & Delgado, 2020; Johnson, 2009; 
Kirchler, Holzl, Rodler, & Meier, 2001; Lavner, Weiss, Miller, & Karney, 2018). However, the 
vast majority of social decision-making experiments to date have relied upon paradigms wherein 
participants make decisions involving a single unfamiliar confederate (Camerer, 2011; 
Feldmanhall & Chang, 2018; Rilling & Sanfey, 2011). Drawing broad inferences about social 
decision-making from paradigms with anonymous others is problematic because close 
relationship status, and even general familiarity, can profoundly influence social behavior 
(Ahmed & Chloe, 2014; Dunham, 2018; Fareri, Chang, & Delgado, 2015; Guassi Moreira & 
Telzer, 2018; McKelvey & Kerr, 1988; Meyer & Anderson, 2000; Telzer, Masten, Berkman, 
Lieberman, & Fuligni, 2010). For example, individuals are inclined to be highly generous to 
close others, sometimes even at a cost to oneself, but less so to strangers (Lockwood et al., 2017; 
Powers et al., 2018; Telzer et al., 2010). Consistent with this, when decision makers are forced to 
choose whose interests to prioritize, they rely heavily on the identity of those involved – for 
example, young adults are more likely to allocate resources to a parent at the expense of a friend 
than the contrary (Guassi Moreira, Tashjian, Galván, & Silvers, 2018, 2019). This suggests that 
social decision preferences may differ depending on whom they affect. 
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At least two issues have yet to be addressed, with regard to how humans make decisions 
impacting close others. First, it is unknown whether or not individuals consistently prioritize the 
same close others when different outcomes are at stake (e.g., do I spend both money and time on 
my parent instead of my friend?). This knowledge gap stems from the fact that prior social 
decision-making work involving close others has primarily examined decision-making 
preferences when monetary outcomes are at stake (Fareri et al., 2020; Guassi Moreira et al., 
2018, 2019; Powers et al., 2018). Determining how stable social preferences are across different 
contexts (e.g., social, financial) is a necessary first step in forming comprehensive and unifying 
theories of social decision-making, which could promote integration between different research 
lines, generate future scientific predictions, and inspire applications outside of the laboratory. 
Second, extant research has failed to tell us the ‘why’ behind social decision-making preferences. 
We do not know why an individual might prioritize one close other over another. Recent 
research suggests that value-based psychological systems are involved in tracking important 
social information (e.g., social status) and close-other status strongly modulates the subjective 
value of rewards (Feng, Zhao, & Donnay, 2013; Hackel, Doll, & Amodio, 2015; Morelli, Chang, 
Carlson, Kullar, & Zaki, 2018; Parkinson, Kleinbaum, & Wheatley, 2017; Wang, Cheng, Lee, & 
Chuang, 2019; Zerubavel, Bearman, Weber, & Ochsner, 2015; Zhao, Feng, & Kazinka, 2014)  
Coupled with the fact that prior studies on social decision-making with close others have found 
evidence of consistent preferences with monetary outcomes (Guassi Moreira et al., 2019), it is 
likely that a value-based psychological architecture may be driving these preferences while also 
leaving open the possibility that non-value-based architectures may drive preferences involving 
other outcomes (e.g., social motivations).  
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In light of the aforementioned gaps in the literature, our study had two major aims. First, 
we examined whether parent-over-friend preferences previously observed in the monetary 
domain would generalize to decision-making contexts that involved social consequences (time 
spent with close other). We used two forms of discounting (delay: overweighting of smaller, 
immediate rewards over larger, delayed rewards; probabilistic: overweighting more certain 
rewards with a smaller expected value over less certain rewards with larger expected values) as 
our model decision-making paradigm largely due to its ability to accommodate both social and 
monetary rewards and amenability to fitting models that can account for both within and between 
subject effects. If prior research generalizes to discounting decisions, we would expect that 
individuals would temporally and probabilistically discount on trials when a parent benefitted 
and refrain from doing so when a parent did not. Moreover, if social preferences are domain-
general, we expected parents would be prioritized both in decisions with financial and social 
outcomes. 
Our second aim was focused on testing two candidate mechanisms that could potentially 
drive parent-versus-friend preferences. The first candidate mechanism was value-based 
computations, the implicit or explicit cognitions that support the subjective appraisal of value. 
Several frameworks have been proposed to formally articulate value-based computations thought 
to underlie decision-making (Feldmanhall & Chang, 2018; Glimcher, 2004; Niv & Chan, 2011). 
While each framework can provide uniquely meaningful information, we elected to adopt 
prospect theory—a dominant decision-making framework from behavioral economics (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1992)—due to its success in characterizing decision-making behavior and ubiquity 
in the field. Prospect theory suggests computations of value are fueled by attitudes towards loss 
and risk. Briefly, loss aversion is the extent to which individuals overweigh losses relative to 
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gains. Risk aversion is the extent to which diminishing sensitivity to marginal rewards reduces 
one’s subjective valuation and engenders “safe”, risk averse behavior. Our focus on these two 
parameters was motivated by the facts that they both inform subjective computation of value and 
are sensitive to social cognitive demands such that they can be flexibly manipulated to support 
broader goals (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009). In the present study we suspected that differences in 
social decision-making behaviors among close others—at both the group and individual level—
could be mechanistically driven by differences in how averse individuals are to loss and risk for 
different close others, in turn influencing the subjective value computations for each close other. 
We note that our use of behavioral economics tasks in conjunction with computational modeling 
is a strength of this study for two major reasons. First, models make precise predictions about 
phenomena in ways that are easily verifiable and generative (i.e., probabilistic). Second, they can 
do not require introspection, and thus provide complementary insights to information gathered 
by self-report (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  
The second candidate mechanism tested was socioemotional motivations. Socioemotional 
motivations were operationalized as reported relationship quality with each close other, under the 
assumption that individuals are motivated to maintain high quality relationships (Gable & 
Impett, 2012). Support for this mechanism would suggest that social preferences are not driven 
by differences in appraisals of value, but instead rely on the fulfillment of socioemotional goals. 
Finally, we also pursued an exploratory aim that tied the former two mechanisms together: 
assessing whether individual differences in candidate mechanisms tracked with individual 
differences in social decision-making preferences.  
Methods 
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Study Overview & Hypotheses 
In the current study, 225 participants completed discounting tasks involving two close 
others, a nominated parent and close friend, to probe social decision-making preferences. 
Decisions were compared under four conditions, a crossed design with two types of 
discounting—probabilistic, delay—and two types of outcomes—social, monetary. We employed 
two types of discounting and two types of outcomes to enhance the generalizability of our 
findings. Value-based computational (or simply, ‘computational’) mechanisms (risk and loss 
aversion, as defined by prospect theory) were derived from behavior on an independent gambling 
task that a set of partially overlapping (overlap: N = 75) participants completed on behalf of a 
parent and friend (separate runs for each, N = 225). All participants (N = 375) additionally 
completed a self-report measure of relationship quality to assess socioemotional motivational 
mechanisms of social decision-making preferences (Inventory of Parent and Peer Attachment; 
IPPA (Armsden & Greenberg, 1987)). Hypotheses, methods, and analyses were pre-registered on 
the Open Science Framework prior to the beginning of the study. See the Methods section for 
more details. Our hypotheses follow (H1 and H2 were pre-registered, H3 was not).  
H1. Based on prior research (Guassi Moreira et al., 2018), participants will favor parents over 
friends during decision-making that involves discounting across two outcome domains (social 
and monetary). As noted in the methods, we operationalize a preference for a given close other 
as discounting when it benefits that individual and refraining from discounting when it does not 
benefit the individual.  
H2. If decision-making preferences (e.g., prioritizing parents over friends) are informed by 
value-based computations, then participants will show group-level differences in loss and risk 
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aversion parameters when making decisions on behalf of a parent and close friend (i.e., 
participants will have different loss and/or risk aversion values for parents compared to friends).  
H3. If socioemotional motivations are consequential for social decision-making preferences, then 
participants will show group-level differences in self-reported relationship quality (our measure 
of said mechanism) with a parent and close friend (i.e., participants will report different levels of 
relationship quality for parents compared to friends).  
We had additional, exploratory aims to relate individual differences in computational and 
motivational mechanisms to decision-making preferences (both aims were pre-registered).  
A1. Determine whether individual differences in computational mechanisms (loss aversion, risk 
aversion) track with individual differences in decision-making preferences.  
A2. Determine whether individual differences in motivational mechanisms (relationship quality) 
track with individual differences in decision-making preferences.  
Participants and Sampling Strategy  
Participants were recruited from the metropolitan area of a large university in the 
Western United States via the undergraduate psychology subject pool. This study was part of a 
broader data collection effort aimed at understanding social decision-making processes involving 
close others—more information is given our pre-registration document 
(https://osf.io/6278m/?view_only=3264b80da15b44cca983e3c45e1f8e6b). For this study, we 
selected a subset of participants who either completed one of two computerized tasks, or both of 
them. N = 225 participants completed a task meant to index social decision-making preferences; 
N = 225 completed a task aimed at capturing computational mechanisms underlying social 
decision-making preferences; N = 75 completed both tasks. Thus, our sample size for the study 
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was set at 375 total participants. The sample size for these cells were determined a priori. In 
setting our sample size, our goal was to recruit enough participants for well-powered tests for 
each task while also having a minimum number to examine cross-task, exploratory correlations 
(see preregistration document for further details). Two participants were excluded from analyses 
for non-compliance and one for being unable to nominate an appropriate close other. Thus, our 
final total sample was comprised of N = 372 (71 males, Mean age = 20.32 years, SD = 1.57, 
range = 18-29). Ethnically, 76 participants identified as Hispanic/Latinx whereas the remainder 
of the sample did not. Racially, 153 participants identified as Asians (41.1%), 119 identified as 
Caucasian (32%), 11 identified as African American (3%), 0 identified as Pacific Islander (0%), 
1 identified as Native American (0.3%), 68 considered themselves to be another race, or mixed 
race (18.3%), and the remaining participants declined to respond about their race. Participants 
provided written consent in accordance with the policies of the local Institutional Review Board, 
and were compensated with course credit for their time. Data, code, and materials are publicly 
available on the Open Science Framework (OSF; 
https://osf.io/d42ar/?view_only=3264b80da15b44cca983e3c45e1f8e6b). 
Procedure 
Upon arriving to the laboratory participants provided informed consent, nominated a 
parent and close friend of their choice, underwent a manipulation to increase the salience of their 
nominated parent and friend, took a survey containing several self-report measures of interest, 
and then completed one of nine possible pairings of two computerized tasks. Though all nine 
pairings were part of a broader data collection effort concerning social decision-making, we only 
report data from two tasks here (other tasks have yielded results published elsewhere (blinded, 
2019), or have not yet been analyzed). An experimenter extensively trained participants on how 
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to complete each task, and proceeded with the experiment only after the experimenter judged the 
participant adequately understood the instructions. The experimenter then unobtrusively 
observed each participant as they completed the experiment to ensure compliance. Key measures 
involved in the current report are described in detail below. Full measures are disclosed in the 
supplement and available on our OSF page 
(https://osf.io/6278m/?view_only=3264b80da15b44cca983e3c45e1f8e6b).  
Parent—Friend Nomination & Salience Manipulation. 
At the beginning of the study, participants were told they would be completing 
hypothetical decisions that would affect a parent and close friend, and that they would be 
required to choose the parent and close friend discussed in the scenarios. Participants were told 
to nominate any parent and any close friend that satisfied the following conditions: both 
individuals were still alive, the friend was not a current romantic partner, the friend was not a 
family member (e.g., sibling, cousin), and the friend was still an active friend (e.g., a friend who 
they no longer kept in touch with was not allowed). Afterwards, we asked participants to write 
down basic information about each person (e.g., name, age, sex), a memory they had with each 
person, and a handful of words and phrases describing each person. The memory manipulation 
was used to enhance the likelihood that close others would be salient in participants minds while 
making hypothetical decisions about them (Guassi Moreira et al., 2018).  
Experimental Tasks and Measures 
Overview. 
At least one of the following two tasks was administered to all participants in the current 
study. A subset of participants completed both sets of tasks. Participants who did not complete 
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both tasks described here completed additional tasks, but those data have been reported 
elsewhere (the full list of tasks is available online in our pre-registration document). All tasks 
were programmed in PsychoPy (v1.90.3) and run on PCs running Windows 10; all surveys were 
administered via Qualtrics. Though all rewards (monetary or social) were hypothetical, 
participants were carefully and repeatedly instructed to complete the tasks as if the rewards were 
truly real. The use of hypothetical rewards here was virtually necessary for social rewards, as we 
could not force participants to actually spend time with a parent or friend of their choice 
Discounting Task. Social decision-making preferences were assessed using a suite of 
discounting decisions. We chose to focus on discounting for several reasons. First, we hoped to 
expand prior work demonstrating a preference for parents over friends in risk taking and 
probabilistic learning contexts (Guassi Moreira et al., 2018, 2019) by assessing whether this 
preference generalized to an entirely different kind of decision-making context. Second, 
discounting decisions are thought to be heavily consequential for wellbeing and adjustment 
outcomes (e.g., 12) since they simulate value-based trade-offs that individuals often encounter in 
everyday life. Last, discounting tasks are flexible and allow for modeling behavior across many 
different reward outcomes (Seaman et al., 2016).  
Participants completed discounting decisions in a fully crossed 2 X 2 design that yielded 
four conditions: one dimension varied in terms of the type of discounting (delay and 
probabilistic) and the other varied in terms of the type of hypothetical reward (monetary and 
social). Regardless of condition, participants were presented with two scenarios and were told 
one would affect their parent and the other would affect their friend. One scenario involved a 
more immediate or certain reward, and another involved a more delayed or uncertain reward. 
Half of the trials in each run involved the parent receiving the former and the friend receiving the 
12 Computations and Motivations of Social Decision-Making 
 
 
latter, while the other half involved the opposite. In the delay discounting conditions, participants 
could choose between a relatively immediate reward or a larger delayed reward—the time delays 
could take the value of zero (i.e., ‘Today’), 2 weeks, 4 weeks, and 6 weeks. In the probabilistic 
discounting conditions, participants could choose between a relatively more certain reward or a 
larger, more uncertain reward—the certainties could take the value of 100% (i.e., no 
uncertainty), 75%, 50%, and 25%. Reward values ranged from 2 to 30 in all tasks. In the 
monetary rewards condition, reward values were treated as being equivalent to US Dollars; in the 
social reward condition, rewards were treated as time spent with either close other (e.g., 16 
minutes spent with one of the nominated close others). There is an inherent asymmetry to this 
design (monetary rewards are won for a close other, social rewards are shared with them), but 
attempts to equate the two could introduce other, more serious confounds (e.g., participants 
could have made social decisions that involved allowing parent/friend to spend time with another 
loved one, but that is unlikely to represent a meaningful preference). For example, on the delay 
discounting task involving monetary rewards, one might choose between earning $6 for their 
parent now or earning $14 for their friend in four weeks. In this particular case, choosing $6 for a 
parent, thereby discounting the $14 reward for a friend, would be consistent with a parent 
preference. Further, someone with such a preference would make the opposite choice when the 
parent-friend labels were reversed (e.g., choosing $14 for a parent in four weeks over $6 for a 
friend now). We assume the same for the social condition—a parent preference is indicated by 
selectively discounting when the parent benefits, and refraining from discounting when it also 
benefits the parent (the opposite pattern would be indicative of a friend pattern). The exact values 
for each trial were adapted from an open resource (osf.io/bths8/). Participants completed 98 trials 
per run and the runs were self-paced (although participants were told not to dwell on any 
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individual choice for too long). Figure 1 (left panel) depicts a schematic of the task. Although all 
rewards were hypothetical, it was heavily stressed to participants they were to complete the task 
as if the rewards were real.  
Gambling Task. In order to understand the computational mechanisms of social decision-
making preferences (i.e., an individual’s tendency to prioritize their parent or friend), we 
employed a simple binary gambling task in which participants played for hypothetical monetary 
rewards. Data from this task are widely used in the behavioral economics literature as a means to 
quantify subjects’ loss and risk aversion (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; Sokol-Hessner, Raio, 
Gottesman, Lackovic, & Phelps, 2016). During the task, participants are required to make 150 
binary decisions between a certain guaranteed reward and a gamble with two potential outcomes 
(50% chance each). Most trials (120) involved a gamble whose two potential outcomes were a 
positive amount and a negative amount (amounts varied across trials), compared to a guaranteed 
option of zero dollars. A subset of trials (30) involved a gamble whose two potential outcomes 
were a positive amount and zero dollars, compared to a guaranteed option of a smaller positive 
amount. See Figure 1 (right panel) for a schematic. The inclusion of these two trial types in the 
task allowed us to tease apart attitudes towards risk and loss1, each of which involve unique 
underlying computations. Probabilities were made explicit to participants during training. Trial 
order was randomly selected across participants. Participants were given unlimited time to make 
their decision on each trial (but were encouraged to not dwell too long on any individual choice), 
and decision outcomes were presented for 1500ms. Monetary values for each trial were used 
from a prior study with open data (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2015; osf.io/i5knh/). Participants 
                                                          
1 Loss and risk aversion tend to be highly correlated. As a result, gain and loss trials are necessary to estimate each 
parameter in the same dataset (See Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009).  
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completed two runs of the task, one in which they were instructed to make decisions as if their 
nominated friend were to be affected and another as if their nominated parent was to be affected. 
Although decisions involved hypothetical monetary outcomes, it was heavily stressed that 
participants were asked to complete the task as if their parent and friend stood to actually gain or 
lose based on the outcomes of the task.  
Inventory of Parent & Peer Attachment (IPPA). We operationalized social motivations 
using a measure of relationship quality with parents and friends. We specifically used 
relationship quality to index motivational mechanisms contingent upon the notion that 
individuals are motivated to maintain high quality relationships. We hypothesized that 
relationship quality might serve as a prospective motivational mechanism behind social decision-
making. As we had done in prior, related studies, relationship quality with parents and friends 
was assessed using the Inventory of Parent and Peer Attachment (IPPA; Armsden & Greenberg, 
1987). The IPPA has been widely used to assess relationship quality (e.g., Fanti, Henrich, 
Brookmeyer, & Kuperminc, 2008) and was initially validated in college-age samples. Using a 5-
point Likert scale (1 = almost never or never, 5 = almost always or always), participants 
answered 28 items about their relationships with their nominated parent (example item: “My 
parent respects my feelings”), and 25 items about their relationship with their nominated friend 
(example item: “When we discuss things, my friend considers my point of view”). Reponses for 
parents and friends were reverse scored as needed and averaged to yield a single mean score of 
parent and friend relationship quality, respectively. Model based reliability statistics show that 
our administration of both parent and friend scales are internally consistent and that composites 
appropriately capture multidimensionality (Parent: ω = .96, ω-hierarchical = .76; Friend: ω = .96, 
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ω-hierarchical = .71). A list of additional self-report measures that were collected can be found 
online in our pre-registration document as well as the Supplement.  
Modeling 
Discounting. Data from all four runs of the discounting task (one for each condition, 
delay discounting with monetary rewards, delay discounting with social rewards, probabilistic 
discounting with monetary rewards, and probabilistic discounting with social rewards) were 
analyzed in four separate random coefficient regression models using the HLM for Windows 
computer program (Raudenbush & Byrk, 2002). We modeled trial-level decisions nested within 
participants using the following equation. 
Logit(Decisionit) = π0i + π1i(Conditionit) + π2i(RewardRatioit) + εit                                  
Here we modeled the log odds of the t-th decision from the i-th participant (1 = discount, = 0 
non-discount) as a function of condition (0 = Friend associated with discounting choice, parent 
associated with non-discounting choice; 1 = parent associated with discounting choice, friend 
associated with non-discounting choice) (note that this condition parameter is different from the 
conditions of the discounting tasks, e.g., delay monetary), and a grand-mean centered reward 
ratio (a ratio of the non-discounting option over the discounting option—greater values indicated 
a greater difference between the more delayed/more uncertain reward and the more 
immediate/more uncertain reward). The π0i parameter represents the intercept (i.e., when 
expected log-odds of making a discounting choice when condition = 0 and when RewardRatio is 
at the grand mean), the π1i parameter is the adjusted logit(odds ratio) of choosing to discount 
when a parent’s outcome is associated with the discounting option (and friend’s outcome is 
associated with non-discounting option) compared to the opposite, and the π2i parameter 
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represents the expected change in the log odds of choosing to discount given a 1 unit increase in 
the RewardRatio (non-discounted reward option divided by the discounted reward option), over 
and above the effect of condition. The Condition variable is coded in such a way that a positive 
value indicates that individuals favor parents over friends (e.g., individuals are more likely to 
discount when a parent benefits at the expense of a friend, less likely to discount when a friend 
benefits at the expense of a parent), a negative value indicates individuals favor friends over 
parents, and a value of zero indicates no preference. Inclusion of the RewardRatio parameter is 
meaningful, because it (i) controls for lower level features of the task and (ii) can indicate 
whether individuals are generally paying attention to the task (i.e., greater RewardRatio should 
be related to decreased discounting behavior, consistent with previous work (Ludwig et al., 
2019)). Notably, these parameters were allowed to vary randomly across participants (i.e., the 
level 2 units). Results in this modeling framework are from the population average solution with 
robust standard errors (modeled over dispersion).  
We ran additional models that included between subject predictors, namely variables 
aimed at capturing underlying computational and motivational mechanisms of decision-making 
preferences. More information is described in the ‘Analysis Plan’ section.  
Gambling. Computational mechanisms of social decision-making were modeled from the 
gambling task data by fitting Sokol-Hessner and colleague’s models derived from prospect 
theory (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009, 2015, 2016; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). The subjective 
utility (u(x)) of objective rewards during the task was calculated using the following piecewise 
functions.  
u(x+) = p(x+) * (x+)ρ 
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u(x-) = -λ * p(x-) * (-x-)ρ 
The two equations model the subjective utilities of gains and losses, respectively. The objective 
monetary amount is represented by x, p(x) represents the probability of the objective monetary 
amount (1 for the guaranteed option, .5 for the gamble), ρ is the risk aversion parameter (1 
indicates risk neutrality, < 1 indicates risk aversion for gains, risk seeking for losses, > 1 
indicates risk seeking for losses, risk aversion for gains), and λ is the loss aversion parameter (1 
indicates gain-loss neutrality, < 1 indicates gain seeking, > 1 indicates loss aversion). Subjective 
utility values were translated into choice probabilities using the SoftMax function.  
p(gamble) = (1 + e -μ * [u(gamble) - u(guaranteed)])-1 
Where e is Euler’s number and μ is a choice consistency parameter. The latter term describes 
whether the relationship between subjective value results choice behavior is stochastic or 
deterministic (greater parameter values indicate more deterministic decision-making). This 
equation was adapted into a likelihood function in order to perform maximum likelihood 
estimation. The optim()function in R was used to perform constrained optimization (Byrd, Lu, 
Nocedal, & Zhu, 1995) on the likelihood function using starting parameters obtained via grid 
search. Loss and risk aversion values were constrained between 0 and 10, whereas choice 
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Every step of the analysis plan was decided a priori unless noted otherwise (i.e., ‘post-
hoc’). We first ran four random coefficient regression models on the discounting data to 
conceptually replicate prior work demonstrating that young adults prioritize parents over friends. 
Specifically, because prior work only examined decision-making with monetary consequences, 
we sought to test in the present study whether young adults would also prioritize parents over 
friends when social outcomes were at stake. Afterwards, we examined possible computational 
mechanisms underlying these social preferences. To do this, we tested whether loss and risk 
aversion parameters, as well as gambling decisions (post-hoc), differed when playing for a parent 
or a close friend. We then examined socioemotional motivational mechanisms underlying social 
decision-making preferences by testing whether relationship quality was greater for a parent or 
friend. For our exploratory aims, we tested whether individual differences in loss and risk 
aversion parameters (and number of gambling decisions, a post-hoc analysis), in addition to 
individual differences in relationship quality, could predict decision-making preferences. Finally, 
we also conducted a post-hoc test that formally compared discounting preferences between social 
and monetary outcomes.  
Results Related to H1: Social Decision-making Preferences for Monetary and Social 
Consequences during Decision-making. The condition parameter (variable describing who was 
affected by a discounting decision, see methods; π1i) was positive and significant for the 
probabilistic and delay discounting runs involving monetary rewards, indicating that participants 
were more likely to favor their parent over a friend. Table 1 lists the coefficient values and 
associated standard errors for each discounting condition’s random coefficient regression model. 
Participants were 34.6% more likely to discount (versus not discounting) when a parent benefited 
from the relatively certain monetary option and a friend benefited from the relatively uncertain 
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monetary option compared to the opposite; participants were 35.5% more likely to discount 
(versus not discounting) when a parent benefited from the relatively immediate monetary option 
and a friend benefited from the relatively delayed monetary option compared to the opposite. 
The condition parameter was marginally significant for the probabilistic discounting run with 
social rewards (17.0% effect size), and was not significant for the delay discounting run with 
social rewards (13.7% effect size). These results showed that individuals were on average more 
likely to favor parents over friends, and these trends were significant for the probabilistic and 
delay discounting runs with monetary rewards, and marginally significant with the probabilistic 
discounting run with social rewards. Figure 2 visualizes these coefficients and their respective 
standard errors. These results conceptually replicate prior work indicating that young adults 
prioritize parents over friends in monetary decisions and partially support hypothesis H1. 
Specifically, they support H1 as related to decisions involving monetary outcomes, but not 
necessarily when they involve social outcomes.   
Results Related to H2: Computational Underpinnings of Social Decision-making Preferences. 
Participants were more likely to choose to gamble when playing for their friend than when 
playing on behalf of a parent (Parent M(SD): 55.32 (25.94), Friend M(SD): 60.06 (27.43); t(221) 
= -3.319, p = .001, Cohen’s d = 0.223, Pearson’s r = 0.684). In terms of risk aversion 
(intolerance of risk arising due to diminishing sensitivity to marginal rewards), participants 
exhibited comparable levels of risk aversion when playing for parents and friends (Parent 
M(SD): 1.34 (1.38), Friend M(SD): 1.44 (1.65); t(221) = -0.849, p > .250, Cohen’s d = 0.053, 
Pearson’s r = 0.223). By contrast, participants tended to be more loss averse (overweighting of 
losses relative to gains) when their decisions affected a parent compared to when their decisions 
affected a friend (Parent M(SD): 2.64 (2.51), Friend M(SD): 2.40 (2.35); t(221) = 1.798, p = 
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.074, Cohen’s d = 0.117, Pearson’s r = .646). These results garner partial, modest support for 
hypothesis H2 in that they suggest a difference in loss aversion, but not risk aversion, explains 
parent-over-friend preferences in decision-making.  
Results Related to H3: Motivational Underpinnings of Social Decision-Making Preferences.  
Though self-reported relationship quality with parents and friends was high overall, participants 
reported relatively higher relationship quality with their nominated friend (M(SD): 4.32 (0.44)) 
compared to their nominated parent (M(SD): 3.92 (0.66); t(371) = 11.488, p < .001,  Cohen’s d = 
.596, Pearson’s r = 0.318). These results strongly support hypothesis H3, since H3 predicted a 
difference in relationship quality between parents and friends. However, we note the direction of 
the effect is the opposite of the direction the significant effects related to H1 and H2 (and is 
consistent with prior related work (Guassi Moreira et al., 2018)).  
Results Related to Exploratory A1: Individual Differences in Computational Biases Shape 
Decision-making with Monetary Outcomes. As shown in Table 2A, we observed that a greater 
propensity to gamble with hypothetical rewards for friends was related to an increased 
propensity to favor parents during both discounting conditions for monetary, but not social 
rewards (aim A1). Effects in a similar direction emerged for parents, but did not exceed our 
threshold for statistical significance. Afterwards, we found that individuals who were less risk 
averse for parents (for gains) tended to be more likely to favor them in the monetary discounting 
conditions. A similar trend emerged for friends (less risk aversion for friends was related to a 
greater propensity to favor them) during probabilistic discounting for monetary rewards. There 
was no relationship between metrics of loss aversion and social decision-making preferences (see 
supplement). Supplementary Figure 1 (top) visualizes these results. 
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Results Related to Exploratory A2: Individual Differences in Motivational Biases Decision-
making with Social Outcomes. Parent and friend relationship quality scores from the IPPA were 
used as between-person predictors in random coefficient regression models of discounting (grand 
mean centered, aim A2). Parent relationship quality predicted trial-by-trial decision-making 
behavior for the discounting runs involving social rewards – participants with greater 
relationship quality with their parents were even more likely to favor a parent over a friend, and 
those with reduced relationship quality were less relatively less likely to favor a parent over a 
friend (Table 3). A similar pattern was present across all discounting tasks with friend 
relationship quality. However, despite non-trivial effect sizes, these friend relationship quality 
results did not reach statistical significance. Supplementary Figure 1 (bottom) visualizes these 
results.  
Post-Hoc Analysis: Directly Comparing Behavior when Monetary vs Social Outcomes are at 
Stake. After observing the results described above, we opted to directly comparing social 
decision preferences between parents and friends when different types of outcomes were at stake. 
A supplementary, follow-up analysis employing traditional computational models of discounting 
(i.e., hyperbolic discounting rates; Burns et al., 2020; Seaman et al., 2018) found some evidence 
to indicate that parent-over-friend discounting preferences were modestly stronger when 
monetary, compared to social rewards, were at stake for delay discounting decisions (Cohen’s d 
= .12). No such effect was observed for probabilistic discounting decisions (Cohen’s d = .06). 
Analytic details and full statistical output is provided in the Supplement.  
Discussion 
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 Every day humans make decisions that affect close others. The present study examined 
how individuals make these decisions and characterized the mechanisms that drive social 
decisions about close others. Consistent with prior work (Guassi Moreira et al., 2018, 2019), the 
present study found that young adults favor their parents over friends when decisions have 
financial consequences. However, these same participants were more equivocal when deciding 
whether to prioritize parents or friends when making decisions with social consequences. In 
evaluating potential mechanisms, computational models revealed that individuals exhibited more 
loss aversion for parents compared to friends. Individuals who demonstrated greater risk 
aversion for their parent, however, were more likely to prioritize parents in decisions with 
monetary consequences, suggesting value-based computations drive social decisions about 
financial resources. Conversely, participants reported greater relationship quality with friends 
than parents when social motivations were assessed, and the magnitude of this motivational bias 
tracked with one’s likelihood of prioritizing a friend in decisions with social outcomes. 
Importantly, computational biases did not track with preferences when social outcomes were at 
stake and vice versa, underscoring the specificity of each mechanism.  
The present findings suggest that value-based computations and socioemotional 
motivations guide different types of social decisions. This pattern of results suggests social goals 
are context-dependent and can dynamically shift decision-making cognitions and behaviors. 
Parents and friends serve different functions in the lives of young adults (Hopmeyer & Medovoy, 
2017; Roisman, Masten, Coatsworth, & Tellegen, 2004) and social obligations are likely to vary 
as a result. Preferences for parents in situations with financial outcomes may thus be driven by a 
need to contribute or reciprocate (Fuligni, 2018). By contrast, the apparent lack of a parent or 
friend preference in decisions with social outcomes (i.e., time spent with close other) may be due 
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to the fact that some individuals prefer spending time with their parent and others with their 
friend, leading to a net zero preference at the group level. It is also important to consider that 
time spent with a close other is not necessarily synonymous with the concept of a social 
preference. It is possible that stronger social preferences would emerge if different social rewards 
were considered (i.e., engaging in specific social activities with different close others), or if 
social preferences were evaluated at different stages of development (e.g., children or middle-
aged adults).   
A post-hoc and preliminary statistical comparison provides some evidence to suggest that 
observed differences between reward types were not due to chance—that parent-oriented 
preferences with monetary rewards are indeed stronger than parent-oriented preferences with 
social rewards when making delay discounting decisions (but not probabilistic discounting). This 
could be due to a number of reasons, ranging from the salience of the social rewards we offered, 
to task demands related to computing value for money compared to social rewards (it may be 
more difficult to compute value calculations for ‘time spent’ than dollars), and to the ease with 
which individuals implicitly compute probabilities when making discounting decisions 
(potentially explaining the null finding when contrasting decision preferences for monetary and 
social outcomes in probabilistic discounting). Additional manipulations in future studies can help 
unpack these effects, perhaps with the help of cross-model reward decisions (e.g., asking 
individuals to assign a monetary value to social outcomes). If these differences are replicated, 
future work may wish to identify why they exist in the first place. We have speculated that 
obligation to parent and friend relationships most likely plays a large role (authors, 2018), but 
were unable to find compelling evidence (and no study measures collected here can speak to this 
notion). Additional work in this vein will need to carefully consider what obligation means in the 
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context of parent and friend relationships, and thoughtfully select (or even devise) methods to 
sensibly equate the two for quantitative analyses. This difficulty highlights the possibility that 
qualitative analysis may be useful in resolving this issue while the field attempts to find an 
appropriate quantitative articulation. Finally, given prior work demonstrating the role that culture 
plays in feelings of familial obligation (Fuligni & Pedersen, 2002; Tsai, Telzer, Gonzales, & 
Fuligni, 2015), future work ought to formally examine how cultural differences shape social 
decision making for parents and friends. 
 Group-level results suggest that young adults exhibit value-based computational biases 
for their parents and social motivational biases for their friends, indicating at least two 
mechanistic pathways by which social decisions are generated. Exploratory analyses indicated 
that individual differences in computational and motivational variables predict decision-making 
preferences, thereby revealing the plausibility and subsequent significance of each mechanism.  
 In terms of computational mechanisms, individuals on average exhibited slightly greater 
loss aversion for parents versus friends and individual differences in risk aversion predicted 
parent-over-friend preferences for monetary rewards. This shows that an individual could be 
presented with a choice containing the same objective return and uncertainty for a parent and 
friend, yet subjectively value the choice differently. As such, this indicates higher-order social 
preferences are built upon basic psychological computations, such as risk assessment, that vary 
as a function of social context (Tamir & Thornton, 2018). That individual differences in patterns 
of subjective valuation were systematically related to social decision-making preferences 
suggests that social goals act as a prism—the same input (i.e., contextual decision features) may 
shine in, and multiple actionable value judgments emerge (i.e., computed subjective value), each 
driving a different pattern of behavior. Crucially, this implies that a nested and unified 
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framework for social decision-making may exist, where behavior is motivated by the arbitration 
of several systems that are differentially weighted depending on numerous features of the 
situation (Sims, 2018). Indeed, this may partially explain why we observed a main effect of loss 
aversion while risk aversion was systematically related to individual differences in decision 
preferences (the decision-making context in the discounting tasks emphasized features salient to 
risk aversion, whereas other scenarios might have underscored individual differences in loss 
aversion). While we cannot yet formalize such a framework, these results suggest that context-
dependent loss and risk calculations underlie social decision making. 
With regard to motivational mechanisms, we found that individuals on average reported 
greater relationship quality with friends compared to parents, while individual differences in 
relationship quality predicted decision-making preferences when social, but not monetary, 
outcomes were at stake. The pattern of preferences observed in decisions with social outcomes is 
a departure from what we observed in this study and others with monetary outcomes (Guassi 
Moreira et al., 2019). That decision preferences were sensitive to contextual features indicates 
that social goals do not manifest uniformly across all contexts. An apparent need to contribute or 
reciprocate may manifest as favoring a parent over a friend when monetary, but not social, 
rewards are at stake. Prior work indicates that friendships are predicated upon the need to feel 
understood by someone or having someone with whom to share thoughts (Arnett, 2000; 
Hopmeyer & Medovoy, 2017; Kaniušonytė & Žukauskienė, 2018). As such, choosing to 
prioritize a friend over a parent during decisions involving social rewards may represent the 
pursuit of these social goals. This possibility is further supported by our individual differences 
finding that relationship quality with one’s friend moderated decision-making behavior regarding 
social rewards. Together, these results show that decision-making involving social outcomes is 
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swayed by motivational, but not computational, biases, and possibly a different set of social 
goals than decisions with monetary outcomes. Given that a vast range of social rewards exist in 
the real world, it is possible – and ought to be addressed in future work – that a different pattern 
might have emerged with different kinds of social rewards (e.g., social capital).  
 Limitations and Future Directions. The present study illustrates how social preferences 
are shaped by contextual features of decision-making scenarios, as well as individual differences 
in computational and motivational biases. Though these notions represent exciting avenues for 
future social decision-making research, direct and conceptual replications are needed to further 
enhance confidence in these conclusions. To fully test the boundary conditions of our findings, 
future work ought to examine decisions about different close others (e.g., romantic partners), 
using other decision-making tasks, and in different developmental and cultural populations. 
These efforts would help identify the generalizability of the present results and flesh out how 
social goals influence lower level psychological processes to influence decision-making 
behavior. In further considering generalizability, it is worth noting that our sample demographics 
(mostly white and Asian-American, mostly female, mostly late adolescent/young adult) is 
certainly not representative of all adults in the United States, let alone the world. Future work 
should strive to examine these effects in other populations, and we caution readers to bear these 
constraints on generalizability in mind when evaluating our results. This is particularly important 
to consider given prior work linking gender to differences in value-based decision making 
(Cardoos et al., 2017; Fancis, Hasan, Park, & Wu, 2015; Zachry, Johnson, & Calipari, 2019), 
though we observed no such gender differences in the present study. Additional follow-up work 
could also focus on directly replicating our individual differences findings with larger sample 
sizes. While we note that our individual difference analyses were well-powered on the strength 
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of having nearly 100 decision-level (level 1) observations (Astivia, Gadermann, & Guhn, 2019; 
Mathieu, Aguinis, Culpepper, & Chen, 2012), future work with larger sample sizes would lend 
increased confidence in the present results by further reducing noise in estimates of random 
slopes and effect sizes and potentially improving power. Replication in larger samples would 
lend increased confidence to the current individual differences results by reducing the likelihood 
that factors tangentially related to sample size (e.g., variability of random slopes, skew of level 2 
variables, etc.) were driving the results here.  
Concluding Remarks. The present results showed that social decision preferences are not 
necessarily conserved when different types of outcomes (monetary versus social) are at stake. 
This was highlighted by the facts that parent relationships tended to be favored over friend 
relationships when monetary outcomes were involved, whereas decision preferences were more 
equivocal when social outcomes are at stake. The present results also shed light on the 
computational and socioemotional underpinnings of social decision preferences, with the former 
influencing individual differences when monetary outcomes were involved and the latter 
influencing individual differences when social outcomes were at stake. These results emphasize 
the importance of delineating social decision behavior across multiple contexts, reinforcing the 
notion that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ heuristic for social decision preferences while hopefully 
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Table 1. Social Decision-making Preferences Across Four Discounting Conditions 
Predictor Probabilistic—Monetary Probabilistic—Social Delay—Monetary Delay—Social 
Intercept -0.240 (.064)*** -0.230 (.068)** -0.162 (.038)*** -0.297 (.074)*** 
Condition 0.297 (.074)*** 0.157 (.082)°° 0.304 (.075)*** 0.128 (.088)° 
Reward Ratio -0.150 (.007)*** -0.138 (.007)*** 0.008 (.005)°° -0.108 (.006)*** 
Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p<.05, °°p<.10, °p<.250. Coefficients are on a logit scale. 
Intercept represents the log likelihood of discounting when condition = 0 and reward ratio is at 
its grand mean. Condition was coded such that 1 = discounting benefits parent, 0 = discounting 
benefits friend (positive values indicate a parent-over-friend preference, negative values indicate 
a friend-over-parent preference). Reward ratio reflects the division of the non-discounting option 
over the discounting option (grand mean centered), thus negative values indicate individuals 
were less likely to discount when the discounting reward was relatively smaller than the non-
















A. Social Decision-making Preferences Across Four Discounting Conditions, Moderated by 
Number of Gamble Decisions During the Gambling Task 
Predictor Probabilistic—Monetary Probabilistic—Social Delay—Monetary Delay—Social 
Intercept 
   Sex 
   Parent GD 
   Friend GD 
 
0.041 (.297)  
-0.055 (.326) 
0.006 (.007)  
-0.014 (.006)* 
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0.004 (.007)  
0.004 (.006) 
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   Parent GD 


















B. Social Decision-making Preferences Across Four Discounting Conditions, Moderated by Risk 
Aversion Parameters from the Gambling Task 
Predictor Probabilistic—Monetary Probabilistic—Social Delay—Monetary Delay—Social 
Intercept 
   Sex 
   Parent ρ 
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   Parent ρ 

















Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p<.05, °°p<.10, °p<.250. Coefficients are on a logit scale. 
Condition was coded such that 1 = discounting benefits parent, 0 = discounting benefits friend 
(positive values indicate a parent-over-friend preference, negative values indicate a friend-over-
parent preference). Sex was coded such that 0 = Male, 1 = Female. Reward ratio reflects the 
division of the non-discounting option over the discounting option (grand mean centered), thus 
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negative values indicate individuals were less likely to discount when the discounting reward 
was relatively smaller than the non-discounting reward. Results reflect robust standard errors 
from the population-average solution. GD refers to the number of ‘gamble’ decisions made when 
completing the task for a parent and for a friend. ρ refers to risk aversion (a potential 
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Table 3. Social Decision-making Preferences Across Four Discounting Conditions, Moderated 
by Relationship Quality 
Predictor Probabilistic—Monetary Probabilistic—Social Delay—Monetary Delay—Social 
Intercept 
   Sex 
   Parent RQ 
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Reward Ratio   
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   Parent RQ 

















Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p<.05, °°p<.10, °p<.250. Coefficients are on a logit scale. 
Condition was coded such that 1 = discounting benefits parent, 0 = discounting benefits friend 
(positive values indicate a parent-over-friend preference, negative values indicate a friend-over-
parent preference). Sex was coded such 0 = Male, 1 = Female. Reward ratio reflects the division 
of the non-discounting option over the discounting option (grand mean centered), thus negative 
values indicate individuals were less likely to discount when the discounting reward was 
relatively smaller than the non-discounting reward. Results reflect robust standard errors from 
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Figure 1. Schematic overviews of the discounting (left) and gambling tasks (right).  
 
 
Note. All rewards were hypothetical. Outcomes for the gambling task depended on participant 
choices (e.g., gamble or safe). Reward values in figure above are blank, but varied across trials. 
The risky option on some trials contained a gain and zero, whereas others contained a gain and 
loss (depicted above). See the methods for more details. The discounting tasks sought to model 
social decision-making preferences between parents and friends; the gambling tasks involved 
completing separate runs for parent and friend, respectively, and helped model computational 
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Figure 2. Visualizing Social Decision-making Preferences (positive Condition values indicate 












Coefficients are on a logit scale. Intercept represents the log likelihood of discounting when 
condition = 0 (Friend benefits from discounting option, parent benefits from non-discounting 
option) and reward ratio (defined below) is at its grand mean. Condition was coded such that 1 = 
discounting benefits parent, 0 = discounting benefits friend. Reward ratio reflects the division of 
the non-discounting option over the discounting option (grand mean centered), such that larger 
values indicate greater reward magnitude for the non-discounting option over the discounted 












Other Measures  
The data in this report come from a broader data collection effort aimed at understanding social 
decision making. The following measures were collected as part of this effort. Notably, this 
effort encompassed several pre-registered hypotheses, a subset of which have already been 
published in a prior report.  
Computerized Tasks 
*Columbia Card Task (results published in [BLINDED]) 
*Social Gambling Task (results published in [BLINDED]) 
*Lexical Trait Judgment Task (results published in [BLINDED]) 
*Vanishing Bandit Task (unpublished) 
Self-Report Surveys 
*Domain Specific Risk Taking Scale (unpublished) 
*Brief Sensation Seeking Scale (unpublished) 
*Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (unpublished) 
*Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, Capacity (unpublished)  
*Substance use scale (unpublished) 
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Supplementary Table 1. 
A. Social Decision Making Preferences Across Four Discounting Conditions, Moderated by 
Number of Loss Aversion During the Gambling Task 
Predictor Probabilistic—Monetary Probabilistic—Social Delay—Monetary Delay—Social 
Intercept 
   Sex 
   Parent λ 
   Friend λ 
 
-0.008 (.313)  
-0.003 (.342) 
-0.021 (.061)  
0.004 (.070) 




  -1.509 (.223)*** 
  0.612 (.259)* 
-0.050 (.055) 
0.029 (.083) 
   -1.152 (.302)*** 




   Sex 
   Parent λ 








-0.080 (.092)  
-0.069 (.092) 
    0.362 (.138)** 
-0.219 (.205) 
   0.086 (.056)° 
 -0.053 (.111) 
0.292 (.330) 
-0.512 (.365)° 
-0.034 (.091)  
 -0.136 (.088)° 
Reward Ratio   
   Sex 
   Parent λ 
   Friend λ 
     -0.194 (.034)*** 
  0.051 (.036)° 
0.005 (.006) 
-0.004 (.006) 
    -0.159 (.022)*** 
 0.012 (.026) 
-0.002 (.006) 
-0.002 (.006) 
  -0.104 (.031)** 
-0.008 (.033) 
   0.007 (.005)°  
 0.005 (.005) 




Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p<.05, °°p<.10, °p<.250. Coefficients are on a logit scale. 
Condition was coded such that 1 = discounting benefits parent, 0 = discounting benefits friend 
(positive values indicate a parent-over-friend preference, negative values indicate a friend-over-
parent preference). Sex was coded such that 0 = Male, 1 = Female. Reward ratio reflects the 
division of the non-discounting option over the discounting option (grand mean centered), thus 
negative values indicate individuals were less likely to discount when the discounting reward 
was relatively smaller than the non-discounting reward. Values in parentheses reflect robust 
standard errors from the population-average solution. λ refers to loss aversion (a potential 
computational mechanism) when completing the task for a parent and for a friend. 
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Supplementary Figure 1. Visualizing Computational and Motivational Effects on Social 
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Note. Coefficients are on a logit scale. Condition was coded such that 1 = discounting benefits 
parent, 0 = discounting benefits friend. 95% confidence intervals are depicted, computed using 
robust standard errors from the population-average solution. Sex was included as a covariate 
(coded 1 = female, 0 = male); Condition was coded such that 1 = discounting benefits parent, 0 = 
discounting benefits friend. Top panel: ‘Rho’ refers to the risk aversion parameter (ρ) and 
captures attitudes about risk towards parent and friend. Bottom panel: RQ refers to relationship 
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